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Administrative Law Pragmatism 
Ronald M. Levin  
When I learned that I would be installed as the William R. 
Orthwein Distinguished Professor of Law, I realized that I would 
need to prepare an installation speech that would befit the occasion. I 
decided that I should emulate past chair recipients who have used 
their installation addresses to expound the unifying themes and core 
theoretical commitments that underlie their teaching and scholarship. 
As I began planning out my own speech, however, I began to feel 
that this wasn’t going to be easy. After all, I’ve been teaching and 
writing about administrative law for many years. And, unfortunately, 
administrative law does not have a strong reputation for liveliness. 
The challenge might be summed up in a story that I have seen 
attributed to Justice Stephen Breyer, who was a longtime professor of 
administrative law at Harvard. Supposedly, he once picked up his 
student course evaluations, and one student wrote: “If I had one hour 
to live, I would like to spend it in Professor Breyer’s class.” He 
thought that was pretty nice, and then he turned the page and found 
that the student continued, “because an hour in Breyer’s class feels 
like an eternity.” 
Administrative law is also a somewhat elusive subject, and 
students aren’t always sure what they’re getting. Two or three 
generations earlier at Harvard, another future Supreme Court Justice 
and administrative law authority, Professor Felix Frankfurter, taught 
a course that he called Public Utilities. According to the folklore, one 
of his students summed up the course in verse: 
 
 
 William R. Orthwein Distinguished Professor of Law, Washington University in St. 
Louis. This is a slightly edited version of an address I gave at my installation ceremony on 
April 1, 2011. The speech was written for a lay audience, and I have not attempted to convert 
that relatively simple presentation into a fully documented and rigorously argued law review 
article. However, I have added a few annotations and amplifications in the footnotes for those 
readers who might be interested in further exploration of its ideas. 
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You learn no law in Public U  
That is its fascination. 
But Felix gives a point of view  
And pleasant conversation. 
Now that’s what I call setting the bar low! Ironically, though, the 
author of that rhyme later became a Frankfurter protégé and a 
specialist in public utilities regulation.
1
 So perhaps we professors 
don’t always understand what we are accomplishing while it is under 
way. At least, that’s the optimistic interpretation. 
My biggest worry about trying to expound my scholarly 
philosophy was that, at first, I was not at all sure that I have one. 
However, as I began looking back at and reflecting on my past 
articles, I noticed that quite a few of them advocated what I called a 
pragmatic approach to their subjects
2
 or praised some prominent legal 
authority for his pragmatism.
3
 So I thought, okay, apparently I do 
have a scholarly philosophy after all (almost like the character in the 
Molière play who was pleased to find out that he had been speaking 
prose all his life without knowing it).
4
 With that thought in mind, I 
decided that I would spend some time today explaining what I mean 
 
 1. See JOSEPH P. LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 15 (1975) (ascribing 
the verse to Francis Plimpton); JEFFREY BRANDON MORRIS, “MAKING SURE WE ARE TRUE TO 
OUR FOUNDERS”: THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 1970–95, at 20 
(1997) (noting that “[a]s a result of a recommendation by Felix Frankfurter made to Walter 
Lippman, Plimpton wrote editorials for the New York World while he was in law school” and 
that at the Debevoise law firm he “was involved in the legal problems of railroad and public 
utilities reorganizations”). 
 2. See Ronald M. Levin, Statutory Time Limits on Judicial Review of Rules: Verkuil 
Revisited, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2203, 2235–39 (2011); Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: 
Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291 345–48 
(2003) [hereinafter Levin, Vacation at Sea]; Ronald M. Levin, Judicial Review of Procedural 
Compliance, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 359, 360 (1996); Ronald M. Levin, Understanding 
Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 740–42, 779–81 (1990) 
[hereinafter Levin, Unreviewability]. 
 3. See Ronald M. Levin, The Administrative Law Legacy of Kenneth Culp Davis, 42 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 315, 343–45 (2005); Ronald M. Levin, A Master Craftsman Leaves the Bench, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 25, 1990, at 3B (commending Justice Brennan’s “measured 
and pragmatic” style). 
 4. MOLIÈRE, LE BOURGEOIS GENTILHOMME, act II, sc. 4, l. 34 (1670). 
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by this notion of pragmatism in the context of administrative law and 
how it has played out in my writing. 
The word “pragmatism” can have a variety of meanings, ranging 
from formal philosophy to popular usage. In the field of law, 
pragmatism commonly means a perspective that evaluates policies by 
looking at how they work out in practice.
5
 The test of a good policy, 
according to this view, is that it leads to beneficial real-world 
outcomes. It can be helpful to contrast pragmatism with formalism 
and various ideologically driven approaches: the pragmatist tends to 
mistrust positions that people take “on principle” if those advocates 
do not take account of how their positions work out in practice. 
Justice Breyer describes himself as a pragmatist.
6
 Here is an apt 
quote from his recent book, Making Our Democracy Work (and it’s 
only a few sentences, so it shouldn’t feel like an eternity): 
Judges should use traditional legal tools, such as text, history, 
tradition, precedent, and purposes and related consequences, to 
help find proper legal answers. But courts should emphasize 
certain of these tools, particularly purposes and consequences 
. . . . 
I do not argue that judges should decide all legal cases 
pragmatically. Rather, I suggest that by understanding that its 
actions have real-world consequences and taking those 
consequences into account, the Court can help make the law 
work more effectively. . . .
7
 
The quote speaks to the role of the judge, but I mean to extrapolate it 
to the world of scholarship and pursue the same basic idea today. 
As Justice Breyer indicates, we are not talking here about a 
simon-pure focus on only one variable. I assume that the usual norms 
of legal craftsmanship apply. So the point is that, within the 
 
 5. For general discussions, developed with far more depth and nuance than is possible 
here, see, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 11–15, 345–405 (1995); Brian Z. 
Tamanaha, Pragmatism in U.S. Legal Theory: Its Application to Normative Jurisprudence, 
Sociolegal Studies, and the Fact-Value Distinction, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 315, 329–37 (1996). 
 6. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW xiii–xiv, 80–
87 (2010). 
 7. Id. at 74. 
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boundaries set by those norms, special attention should be given to 
the way in which policies or doctrines work out in actual operation. 
An example of this type of analysis in my work is the article that I 
wrote called “’Vacation’ at Sea,”8 which of course had nothing to do 
with ocean voyages. It was about the confusion surrounding the 
courts’ practice of vacating administrative rules that they find to be 
illegal. In other words, when a court sends a rule back to an agency 
for further consideration, does it have to throw out the rule, or does it 
have the option of letting the rule remain in effect while the agency is 
responding to the court’s objections? 
There is a perfectly decent argument made by some judges
9
 that 
the latter practice—letting the rule remain in effect—is flatly illegal. 
They point out that the Administrative Procedure Act, if you read it 
literally, says that a court “shall . . . set aside” an agency action that it 
finds to be unlawful.
10
 There is also a countervailing argument, which 
I made in the article, based on canons of statutory construction.
11
 
That is a respectable doctrinal argument. But the driving force behind 
the article’s analysis was that courts need the power to remand rules 
without vacating them, because it would sometimes be highly 
disruptive to suddenly eliminate a regulation that has already gone 
into effect and that people are depending on.
12
 For example, the 
government should not adopt regulations on food stamps without 
seeking public comment first, and if it does, it should fix that 
situation; but you don’t want poor people to have to go without food 
stamps for a few months while that error is being repaired.
13
 And you 
also want the EPA to have rules in place to deal with serious safety 
hazards such as releases of radioactive material, even during a period 
in which the EPA is repairing a mistake in the way those rules were 
issued.
14
 These examples are drawn from real cases, and I argued that 
 
 8. Levin, Vacation at Sea, supra note 2. 
 9. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Randolph, J., 
concurring); Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 757 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Sentelle, J., 
dissenting). 
 10. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006). 
 11. Levin, Vacation at Sea, supra note 2, at 310–15. 
 12. See id. at 298–305. 
 13. See Rodway v. USDA, 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
 14. See Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
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a court should at least have the option of responding to practical 
factors of this sort. 
Now, you may be thinking that, even if this type of pragmatic 
reasoning is valid, there is nothing very distinctive about it. After all, 
most legal academics tend to make some practical arguments in 
support of their positions. This is a fair point. But I want to go a step 
further and outline a narrower, and definitely non-vacuous, concept 
that I will call administrative law pragmatism. By this I mean a belief 
in trying to accomplish social ends effectively through the use of the 
administrative process.
15
 
Now we’re talking about not only an analytical style, but also a 
matter of institutional choice. Administrative agencies have some 
advantages over other means by which society tries to solve its 
problems, but they also have some limitations. For example, they can 
be good in terms of deploying expertise and specialized experience, 
but not so good in terms of being vulnerable to rigidity or overly 
political impulses. So opinions about this institutional choice can 
differ, but the administrative law pragmatist emphasizes the positive 
side of the equation. 
To illustrate this concept on a more concrete level, I’m going to 
do what law professors typically do: discuss a case. The case is FDA 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
16
 In this case, which was 
decided a little over ten years ago, the Supreme Court struck down 
the FDA’s rules that restricted the promotion and sale of tobacco 
products to minors. The Court held that the agency had no 
jurisdiction over tobacco.
17
 It was a 5-4 decision with a majority 
opinion by Justice O’Connor and a dissent by Justice Breyer. I’m 
 
 15. This mode of analysis is loosely adapted from philosophers’ concept of pragmatism, 
but I do not pretend that it can be deduced in any rigorous fashion from that concept. It is not 
even the only theory that can lay legitimate claim to the banner of “administrative law 
pragmatism.” Professor Shapiro has developed a similarly named theory in an essay that seems 
primarily devoted to analyzing, on pragmatic grounds, the doctrines of administrative law itself. 
See Sidney Shapiro, Pragmatic Administrative Law, in ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: THE 
REFORMATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2005), http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/art1. The 
argument presented here has a similar aspiration, but it also seeks to apply concepts of 
pragmatism to evaluating the utility of regulation itself. 
 16. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 17. Id. at 161. 
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going to support Justice Breyer’s side. He would have upheld the 
regulations. 
Two things about the majority’s decision made it a bit surprising. 
The first was that the language of the provision under which the 
agency had acted was broad enough to apply to tobacco, or so the 
Court assumed for purposes of its decision.
18
 The second was that the 
Court agreed with the FDA that tobacco use is a public health 
problem of enormous dimensions, causing thousands of premature 
deaths every year.
19
 Nothing in the Court’s opinion identified any 
specific practical problems with the regulations, such as being too 
expensive, ineffective, burdensome for tobacco farmers, etc. 
So what was the problem? The majority had two main objections 
to the rule. First, Congress had passed a few related statutes that 
regulated tobacco, such as the law that requires Surgeon General’s 
warnings on cigarette packages. The Court treated these statutes as 
evidence that Congress had long since decided that the FDA itself 
could not or should not have jurisdiction over tobacco.
20
 I doubt the 
Court could have rested on this point alone, however. You could 
argue instead that Congress had reached no conclusion one way or 
the other about the FDA’s authority over tobacco.21 After all, it could 
have directly told the FDA to stay out of this area, but it never did. 
Justice O’Connor’s second main reason for doubting the FDA’s 
jurisdiction over tobacco—probably the key reason—was that the 
agency’s mission is to ensure that the products that it does regulate 
are “safe” and “effective.”22 But tobacco use is unsafe and can’t be 
made safe. Therefore, the Court said, if the FDA were to take 
jurisdiction over tobacco products, it would have to ban them from 
the market entirely, a result that none of the parties and nobody on 
the Court was advocating.
23
 
 
 18. Id. at 131–32 (assuming arguendo that nicotine is a “drug” and that tobacco products 
are drug delivery “devices,” because they are “intended to affect the structure or any function of 
the body,” as required by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 321(g)(1)(C), 321(h) (2006)). 
 19. 529 U.S. at 125, 127–28, 161. 
 20. Id. at 143–59. 
 21. The dissent did rely on this argument. Id. at 181–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 22. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2) (2006). 
 23. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 137. 
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The dissenters thought this interpretation of the Act was 
“perverse”24—or, if you will, not up to snuff. Why would you want to 
say that the FDA has no jurisdiction over tobacco because it is more 
dangerous than the products that the agency does regulate? This 
defeats the fundamental purpose of having a Food and Drug 
Administration. Thus, the dissenters argued, the Court ought to find a 
way to read the Act flexibly enough to allow the FDA to regulate 
tobacco without banning it.
25
 
So now we have come to the crux of the issue. The majority was 
right to say that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was not 
ideally designed to handle problems of tobacco regulation. But 
Justice Breyer’s dissent aptly captures the spirit of what I am calling 
administrative law pragmatism. If the language and history of the 
statute were inconclusive, the regulations would alleviate a serious 
social problem, and the majority was unprepared to identify any 
problems those regulations would cause, why not read the Act 
flexibly and avoid the anomaly of saying that the FDA can’t do 
anything about tobacco because it’s too dangerous? 
In short, the Breyer and O’Connor opinions in Brown & 
Williamson seem to reflect fundamentally different premises about 
how to interpret regulatory legislation. One side is very receptive to 
administrative creativity to ameliorate pressing social problems, and 
the other side is more skeptical. 
But now I want to add another dimension to my example of 
tobacco regulation. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see some of 
the other ways in which our legal system could have, and actually 
has, come to grips with the same public health challenge. In 2009 
Congress finally gave the FDA explicit authority over tobacco 
products.
26
 You could argue that this legislation retroactively justifies 
the Supreme Court’s ruling, because, by clearing away the FDA 
regulations back in 2000, the Court set the stage for a more 
democratically legitimate outcome from the popularly elected branch 
of government. But if you start with the premise that Congress is by 
 
 24. Id. at 174, 180–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 25. Id. at 179–81. 
 26. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 
1776 (2009). 
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definition the right body to take the action, you are probably not an 
administrative law pragmatist. 
The question I would ask is whether the rules authorized by the 
2009 Act will actually turn out to be better than the FDA’s, or 
perhaps whether the tobacco industry will comply more readily 
because they came from Congress. I don’t know of any clear reason 
to think that the answer to those questions is yes.
27
 So I am not so 
sure that it was better to wait an extra decade to get safeguards into 
place. 
Meanwhile, we can also see that the tobacco industry has in the 
intervening years been hit with civil suits brought by state attorneys 
general and private plaintiffs, as well as a civil RICO suit brought by 
the Justice Department.
28
 Were those superior methods of holding the 
industry accountable? A self-respecting pragmatist would not offer a 
firm opinion without a careful inquiry into how they respectively 
worked out.
29
 However, an administrative law pragmatist might at 
least start with the hypothesis that the administrative solution had 
some built-in advantages that the others did not: an expert agency, 
political oversight, a system of deliberation that emphasizes broad 
participation, a duty imposed on the agency to respond to points 
raised by all sides, and judicial review of the agency’s conclusions to 
help ensure their scientific validity. A judge or jury would not seem 
to have those structural advantages.
30
 
 
 27. For a decidedly pessimistic assessment of the 2009 Act by one expert on food and 
drug law, see James T. O’Reilly, FDA Regulation of Tobacco: Blessing or Curse for FDA 
Professionals?, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 459 (2009). 
 28. See generally Micah J. Berman, Smoking Out the Impact of Tobacco-Related 
Decisions on Public Health Law, 75 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (2009) (summarizing intervening 
developments). 
 29. Some scholars have raised serious doubts about the capacity of civil litigation to 
handle the public health challenges of tobacco use. See, e.g., Arthur B. LaFrance, Tobacco 
Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors and Public Policy, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 187, 198–99, 200–03 
(2000); Peter D. Jacobson & Kenneth E. Warner, Litigation and Public Health Policy Making: 
The Case of Tobacco Control, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 769 (1999). More recently, the 
federal government’s civil RICO action has gone to judgment, with substantial relief being 
awarded and upheld. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
However, the relief in this case excluded certain remedies, such as required counter-marketing 
and smoking cessation programs and disgorgement of past profits, because these remedies were 
found to be unauthorized by the RICO statute. Id. at 1147–50. 
 30. See generally Peter H. Schuck, The New Ideology of Tort Law, 92 PUB. INTEREST 93, 
107–09 (Summer 1988) (contending that “even a brief comparison of the courts’ policymaking 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol37/iss1/10
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This last point about procedures and judicial review leads me to 
draw attention to an important qualification in the overall concept 
that I am laying before you. It may have sounded as though I am 
arguing in favor of giving administrative agencies as much power as 
possible, but that is not what I intended. Limitations on agency power 
through orderly procedures, political oversight, and judicial review 
are themselves part of the overall administrative law system. The 
administrative law pragmatist does not try to minimize these controls, 
but he asks that they should themselves be evaluated according to 
how well they work, as opposed to being simply taken for granted 
because they are traditional or because they fit an abstract model. 
Another of my past law review articles is relevant to this point. 
This one was about defining which administrative actions should be 
exempt from judicial review.
31
 I did not argue that this category 
should be expanded as much as possible (or for that matter that it 
should be narrowed as much as possible). I did argue, however, that 
the Supreme Court’s doctrines on this subject did not pay enough 
attention to practical factors such as the institutional abilities and 
limitations of the courts and the social importance of getting judicial 
input on various types of issues.
32
 For example, the courts usually 
have more to contribute regarding issues of law than regarding issues 
of fact.
33
 
So, from my point of view, regulatory systems—which include 
both generously defined powers for administrative agencies and 
checks on the exercise of those powers—have much to offer in our 
complex society. 
I am not under any illusion, however, that I have articulated a 
model that everybody can be expected to get behind. We all know 
that many people in our society are deeply skeptical about 
administrative regulation as a tool for social problem-solving. Right 
now we’re seeing that skepticism play out tangibly in the form of 
government-wide budget restraints that leave regulatory agencies 
 
capacities with those of legislatures and agencies indicates the severe limitations on courts’ 
competence to perform the kind of policymaking to which their new ideology of tort law 
commits them”). 
 31. Levin, Unreviewability, supra note 2. 
 32. Id. at 740–42, 779–80. 
 33. Id. at 746–50. 
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without enough resources to carry out their assigned tasks. Our 
former dean, Joel Seligman, recently spoke here about how the SEC’s 
ability to implement last year’s financial reform bill is being impaired 
by inadequate funding for personnel to do the job.
34
 The same 
situation prevails at numerous other agencies.
35
 
I don’t expect the debate over the merits of administrative law 
pragmatism to be resolved any time soon, or even that we can foresee 
any broader consensus about it than exists right now. Instead, the 
lesson I would draw is that supporters of regulation as a mode of 
governance will need, for the indefinite future, to make their case for 
it to a mistrustful world. They will have to show, in particular 
contexts, that the administrative process can operate efficiently as 
well as fairly. There is plenty of room for further study and debate 
about these questions, and I look forward to exploring many of their 
dimensions myself in future years. 
 
 34. Joel Seligman, President, University of Rochester and former Dean, Washington 
University School of Law, Tyrrell Williams Lecture, The Future of Financial Regulation, (Mar. 
3, 2011), in Key Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act for Independent Regulatory Agencies, 89 
WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). 
 35. See RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS AND THE BATTLE TO 
PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 54–71 (2010); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial Review of 
Agency Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 61 (1997); 
For Regulatory Agencies, Intrigue in an Otherwise Bleak Budget, OMB WATCH, Feb. 12, 2010, 
available at http://www.ombwatch.org/node/10762. 
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